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Co.,47 upon which the lower court relied. "....

we believe the settlor
evidenced her intention to give a remainder to her next of kin because
she (1) made a full and formal disposition of the principal of the
trust property, (2) made no reservation of a power to grant or assign
an interest in the property during her lifetime, (3) surrendered all
control over the trust property except the power to make testamentary
disposition thereof and the right to appoint a substitute trustee, and
(4) made no provision for the return of any part of the principal to
herself during her lifetime." 48
The Richardson case now gives rise to perplexity as to the
course which the courts may follow hereafter. The policy of liberalizing revocations and the realistic approach seem to have been abandoned. Certainly the atmosphere is shrouded in doubt and heavy
and dark clouds once more hang over Doctor v. Hughes. Clarification is indicated, if not imperative. There-is no comfort to be found
in the recently enacted Article 79 of the Civil Practice Act which
merely defines procedural methods to be followed in trust accountings.4 9 The remedy would lie in retroactive statutory enactments
and should receive the closest consideration of the New York State
Law Revision Commission.
DANIEL M.

SHIENTAG.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS WHERE STATUTE REQUIRES AGENT'S
AUTHORITY TO BE IN WRITING

A majority of jurisdictions in the United States have Statutes
of Frauds which require an agent's authority to be in writing under
certain circumstances.- There is considerable variation as to the situations which require written authority on the part of the agent; some
statutes require such authority in all situations wherein the Statute
of Frauds applies, 2 while others make no provision that the agent's
4 See note 34 supra.
48 120 N. Y. L. J. 411 (Ct. of App. Sept. 13, 1948).
49N. Y. Cn,. PRAc. AcT §§ 1307-1319. But see Ninth Annual Report of
the Judicial Council, 1943 LEG. Doc. No. 20, pp. 311-312.
%Typical of these statutes are CAL. Civ. CODE §2309 (1937); DEL. REV.
CODE § 3106 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT., c. 59, § 2 (1943); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 106 (1935); N. J. REv. STAT. §§ 25:1-1, 25:1-2 (1937); PA. STAT. ANN.,

tit. 33, § 1 (1936); TEx. STAT. REv. Civ., art. 1288 (1936); VT. PuB. LAWS
§ 1675 (1933).
2A typical statute is CAL. Civ. CoDE § 2309 (1937): "An authorization
is sufficient for any purpose, except that an authority to enter into a contract
required to be in writing can only be given by an instrument in writing."
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authority be in writing under any circumstances. 3 Still others demand written authority only in specified real property cases. 4 What
might be regarded as typical provisions are the New York statutes:
An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a
term not exceeding one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property, or in any manner relating thereto, can not
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by
act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing,
subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.5 (Italics ours.)
A contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void,
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party
to be charged, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.6 (Italics ours.)
This type of provision, clear on its face, in most instances has
occasioned no difficulty in construction. A definite problem has
arisen, however, in applying such a provision to corporations; since
by their very nature, corporations can act only through the agency of
human beings. It therefore follows that a relationship of principal
and agent will often exist. While it has been generally recognized
that the agency clause in the Statute of Frauds applies to the acts of
corporations as well as individuals, 7 difficulty has arisen in determining the precise manner of application where corporate officials are
involved.
3 See CONN. GFN. STAT. §§ 5982, 5983 (1930); MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 259,
22 1-6 (1933).
4 See N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §2 242, 259, quoted in text, infra p. -.
5N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242.
6 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259. The provision requiring the agent's authority to be in writing was added by Laws of 1934, c. 750. The old statute
read: "A contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void, unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in
writing, subscribed by the lessor or grantor, or by his lawfully authorized
agent."
It is interesting to note that N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259-a does not require the agent's authority to be in writing: "A contract to devise real property or establish a trust of real property, or any interest therein or right with
reference thereto, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum
thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or
by his lawfully authorized agent."
Prior to the change in Section 259 in 1934, the problem of whether the
agent's authority had to be in writing did not arise. See Brune v. Vom Lehn,
112 Misc. 342. 183 N. Y. Supp. 360 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd men., 196 App. Div.
907, 187 N. Y. Supp. 928 (2d Dep't 1921).
7 See Note, 37 C. J. S. Frauds, Statute of, § 207, n. 79, 80 (1943).
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The general rule would appear to be that an act of an executive
corporate officer, required to be in writing by a Statute of Frauds,
need not be authorized in writing.8 The application of this general
rule might lead to another problem, namely, that of determining just
which corporate officials are to be included in the categorical term
"executive officers." Because of the magnitude of corporate business, corporations have found it necessary to elect a considerable number of officials in order to distribute the managerial work efficiently.
The Home Title Guaranty Company, for example, has one president,
five vice-presidents, one treasurer, one secretary, one assistant vicepresident, six assistant secretaries, and one assistant treasurer.
Assuming that all of these officials had contracted for the sale of land
on behalf of the corporation, it would be a difficult problem to determine which of them would fall into. the "executive officer" category so as to warrant the application of the general rule. In dealing
with such instances, courts have held that for the purposes of the rule
the term "executive officer" includes a president,9 a treasurer, 10 a
secretary-treasurer," and a vice-president. 12 It must be remembered
that such nominal titles alone are not the sole basis upon which the
corporate liability is determined; for closely tied up with this phase
of the problem is the question of the express, implied and apparent
scope of the particular officer's authority. Just who will be excluded
from the category will depend upon the facts in each particular case,
with particular emphasis upon the official title and the scope and
nature of the officer's authority.
The first important decision tending toward the establishment
of the majority rule was a Missouri case, Donovan v. P. Schoenhofen
Brewing Co. 13 There it appeared that a contract for a lease for more
than one year was made on behalf of the corporation by its general
agent on the basis of oral authority.' 4 The court was of the opinion
that, inasmuch as the act done was within the scope of the agent's
implied powers, he was not required to have written authority.' 5
s McCartney v. Clover Valley Land & S. Co., 232 Fed. 697 (C. C. A. 8th
1916).
OBlack Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Jones Coal Co., 204 Ala. 506, 86
So. 27 (1920); Arnold v. La Belle Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 290, 190 Pac. 815,
817 (1920); Potter v. Fon Du Lac Park Dist., 337 Il.111, 168 N. E. 908
(1929).
10 McCartney v. Clover Valley Land & S. Co., supra note 8.
I Uline Loan Company v. Standard Oil Company, 45 S. D. 81, 185 N. W.
1012 (1921).
12 Emmerglick v. Philip Wolf, Inc., 138 F. 2d 661 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
1392 Mo. App. 341 (1901).
24 The extent of the agent's authority appears from the statement of the
court: "In this case it appears . . . that Dienger's agency was to look after
the sale of defendant's beer which involved the renting of places where it
be sold." Ibid. at 346.
might
15 "But from the very necessity of the thing that law may not have room
for application where the agent is the agent of a corporation, and the act of
contracting for a lease, or of leasing, is such an act as is within the scope of
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Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion
to consider a similar problem in Henry v. Black.' In that case the
treasurer of a realty corporation, who was also a stockholder, took
an option in his own name and, together with a director, sold real
property to the plaintiff, substituting the corporation as the vendor
and receiving a commission from the original owner. The court held
that the provision in the Pennsylvania statute requiring written authorization was not applicable to this type of corporate officer. "That
a corporation which can only conduct its business by and through its
officers and employees, must show, .

.

. a written authority to that

officer . . when that officer acting for the company executes a written contract . . would be to stretch the inhibition of the statute far
beyond anything contemplated by its framer." 17
What seems to be the earliest recognition of the problem in News
York is the lower court dictum in Riviera Realty Co. v. Henry,'
wherein the corporate superintendent executed a lease on behalf of
the corporation. While actually holding that the agent's signature
did not bind the corporation because it was not in proper form, the
court indicated that it was not necessary under the statute 19 for an
officer's authority to be in writing.20 The same conclusion was
reached
three years later in McCartney v. Clover Valley Land & S.
21
Co.,

a federal decision which is commonly regarded as the leading

case involving this issue. The chief executive officer of a corporation, who was also its treasurer and a director, arranged an exchange
of real property for the corporation without any written authority,
and the circuit court of appeals, construing the California Civil
Code, 22 unequivocally ruled that the requirement of an agent's authority to be in writing had no application to the executive officers of a corporation. 23 To the same effect was an Alabama
his authority. For a corporation can only act through agents, and when the
act of the agent is within the limit of the authority which his agency covers,
it is the act of the corporatim itself, and the agent may act as though he was
the principal.' Ibid. at 345, 346.
16210 Pa. 245, 59 Atl. 1070 (1904).
11 Id. at 252, 59 Atl. at 1072.
18 144 N. Y. Supp. 790 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
19 The provision in question was N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242. For the
text of this statute see text, supra p. 102.
20 144 N. Y. Supp. 790, 792 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
21232 Fed. 697 (C. C. A. 8th 1916).
"The following contracts are invalid,
22 CAL. CiV. CODE § 1624 (1937):
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent: . . . 4. An agreement for
the leasing for a longer period than one year or for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein; and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing,
subscribed by the party sought to be charged. .. ."
23 McCartney v. Clover Valley Land & S. Co., srapra note 8 at 701. "It
has never been the practice to require powers of attorney to confer authority
upon such agents. We think the statute was intended to apply to agents proper;
that is, persons who were not officers of the corporation. The executive officer
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case 24 in which the court regarded the president as the "alter ego" of
the corporation 25 and a California case holding that the president of
a corporation did not need written authority. 26 The same rule has
been applied to the president of a municipal park board 2 7 and to the
secretary-treasurer of a loan company, 28 but not to a railroad land
of a corporation is something more than an agent. He is the representative
of the corporation itsef. It was early decided that directors, though they
are only agents of the corporation, are exempt from the rule which requires
the authority of an agent to be in writing in order to vest him with power
to execute
a deed."
24
Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Jones Coal Co., 204 Ala. 506, 86 So.
27 (1920).
25 In this case the president of the defendant corporation signed a contract
with the plaintiff which by its terms was not to be performed within one year.
The Alabama code required that an agent be authorized in writing to execute
such a contract on behalf of his principal. The court said: "He was, in a
sense, the agent of his corporation; but in another sense, ...he was, for the
purpose of transacting its business, the corporation's alter ego, and, according
to the authorities and the clear reason of the matter, the contract in question
was,2 8 presumptively at least, signed by the corporation." Ibid.
PArnold v. La Belle Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 290, 190 Pac. 815, 817 (1920),
where the president of the defendant corporation authorized the plaintiff broker,
in writing, to offer far sale real estate owned by the corporation. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1624 (1937) provides:
"The following contracts are invalid, unless
the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed

by the party to be charged or by his agent:

. . . 6. An agreement author-

izing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for

compensation or a commission; . . ." and CAL. Crv. CODz §2309 (1937)

pro-

vides: "An oral authorization is sufficient for any purpose, except that an
authority to enter into a contract required by law to be in writing can only
be given by an instrument in writing." The court, construing these provisions,
said: "That when section 1624, supra, is construed with and in the light of
section 2309 . . .requiring an agent's authority to execute a contract in writing to be itself in writing-it does not, we think, apply to the executive officers
of a corporation."
In Carrier v. Piggly Wiggly of San Francisco, 11 Cal. App. 2d 180, 53
P. 2d 400, 401 (1936), the court said: "Appellant contends that, since the
contract was one, of necessity, in writing, the authority of the corporate agent
to enter into the same must have been in writing. The trend of authority is
to the contrary. Corporations can act only through the agency of natural
persons, and it has been held that the authority of an agent of a corporation
need not be in writing, so far as the Statute of Frauds is concerned." But cf.
Matheron v. Ramina Corporation, 49 Cal. App. 690, 194 Pac. 86 (1920), where
the court was of the opinion that the fact that one contracting to purchase
land in behalf of a corporation was its president is not alone sufficient to show
that he was authorized to enter into such a contract.
27 Potter v. Fon Du Lac Park Dist., 337 Ill.
111, 168 N. E. 908, 911, 912
(1929). The case involved an action for specific performance of a contract
to sell a tract of land to the defendant corporation. The court held: "It is
next contended that the president of the park board was not authorized, in
writing, to execute the contract, and that therefore the same is within the
Statute of Frauds and void; ... The Statute of Frauds applies to a corporation as it does to an individual. . . .The president is the head and one of the
executive officers of the park board, and in signing a contract does not do so
as agent but rather as nrincipal. The rule as to agency does not apply to an
executive
officer of a corporation, who is more than an agent."
28
Uline Loan Company v. Standard Oil Company, 45 S. D. 81, 185 N. W.
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agent on
the ground that he was outside the category of executive
2
officers.

In considering the question whether the officer, in addition to
being an executive officer, must have express, implied or at least apparent authority to execute the contract in question, in order to be
exempt from the requirement of a writing, it would appear that some
authority is necessary, most courts tending towards agreement with
the McCartney case view to the effect that "Let it be once established
that the making of the contract is within the scope of the officer's
authority, then no separate writing is required from the board or the
stockholders to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds." 30
The minority current of authority, as exemplified particularly
by the New Jersey rule, is that any corporate agent or officer, whether
or not acting within his authority, must have a written authorization.
Representative of this viewpoint is Clement v. Young-McShea
Ainusement Co. 1 in which a lease was signed by the owner of a
large majority of the stock of a corporation, who was also treasurer,
manager, and a director. Despite this officer's paramount position,
1012, 1013 (1921).
Here the secretary-treasurer of the corporate plaintiff
executed an option contract in the name of the corporation giving the defendant a 30-day option within which to buy certain lots. Defendant exercised
the option and a contract in writing was executed on behalf of the plaintiff
by its secretary-treasurer. Plaintiff's board of directors adopted a resolution
repudiating the transaction basing their refusal on the fact that such act was
not within the scope of his authority. The court, in upholding -the defendant's
counterclaim for specific performance of the contract, said: "The respondent
corporation was organized for the purpose of loaning money on real estate and
other security, and it was also expressly authorized 'to take, buy, hold, sell,
mortgage, use, and lease real estate.' . . . Elliott was the sole officer in charge
of the operations of respondent, and ... was clothed by the directors with the
authority of general manager. Therefore his acts, within the scope of the
business of the corporation, were the acts of the corporation itself, and not
the acts of an agent, within the ordinary meaning of the word 'agent.'"
29 Rosenblum v. New York Cent. R. R., 162 Pa. Super. 276, 57 A. 2d 690,
691 (1948). Here the defendant appealed from a decree of specific performance of a contract for the sale of land executed by its general land agent.
Citing Henry v. Black, 210 Pa. 245, 59 At. 1070 (1904), the court said:
"Giving the fullest extent to the Henry case, written authority was not required to be shown as to written contracts in the name of the corporation
executed by an executive officer of the corporation ...
"We think that any variation of the rule enunciated by our statute, insofar
as corporations are concerned, must be confined to executive officers of the
entity, and cannot be extended to officers of the business thereof." See also
Frudden v. Peppers Fruit Co., 71 Cal. App. 245, 14 P. 2d 874 (1932) ; Power
v. Immigration Land Co., 93 Minn. 247, 101 N. W. 161 (1904).
so McCartney v. Clover Valley Land & S. Co., 232 Fed. 697, 701 (C. C. A.
8th 1916). To the same general effect see Corporation of America v. Harris,
5 Cal. App. 2d 452, 43 P. 2d 307, 310 (1935), where the court commented,
". .. that the president of a corporation has no authority, by virtue of his
office alone, to bind the corporation by contract . . . 'is an elementary principle of corporation law.'" See also Matheron v. Ramina Corporation, 49
Cal. App. 690, 194 Pac. 86 (1920).
31 70 N. J. Eq. 677, 67 Atl. 82 (1906), reversing 69 N. J. Eq. 347, 60 Atl.
419 (1905).
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the court held that the corporation was not bound on the lease because his authority was not in writing.32 A later New Jersey decision 3 reached a similar conclusion in respect to a vice-president
who had executed a lease. This holding is distinguished from that of
the Clement case, however, because the vice-president's execution of
the lease was not in the usual course of business of the corporation,
and it could therefore be argued that the vice-president in no event
had authority to execute it.
Although the question in New York seems not to have been
squarely passed upon, a strong dictum in a recent lower court decision 34 indicates a tendency to follow the majority view. The case
involved the signing by the president of a corporation of a contract
for the sale of real property without a written authorization so to do.
The actual holding was that the corporation was free of obligation
on the contract because the president's signature was in such form
32

Id. at 682, 67 Ati. at 84, "To render that transaction valid, either in law

or equity, against Young's principal, his authority must have been in writing,
and, where a written authority is required by the very nature of the transaction, it is the duty of persons dealing with the agent to make inquiries as to
the nature and extent of the authority.
follows:

. .

."

The statute involved read as

"All leases . . . of . . . any . . . tenements . . . made or created

by parol and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or
creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing,
shall have the force and effect of leases at will only, and shall not either in
law or equity be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or
effect
33 ..... "
Stammelman v. Interstate Co., 111 N. J. Law 122, 166 At. 724 (1933),
rev'd on other grotuds, 112 N. J. Law 342, 170 Atl. 595 (1934). See also
Lindhorst v. St Louis Protestant Orphan Asylum, 231 Mo. 379, 132 S. W. 666,
670, 671 (1910), which overrules Donovan v. P. Schoenhofen Brewing Co.,
92 Mo. App. 341 (1901). The Lindhorst case involved a real estate agent,
and the court, in holding that the agent needed written authority, castigated
the reasoning in the earlier Donovan opinion. "With all due regard for the
opinion of that learned court, we are not favorably impressed with the reasoning by which the conclusions there stated are reached. The statute in question is general in its provisions, and contains no such exception as that interpolated into it by the Court of Appeals. Nor is there any better reason suggested for saying that the authority of an agent of a corporation to sell its
real estate need not be in writing, than there is for saying that the agent of
an individual for the same purpose need not be in writing. It is common
knowledge that, prior to the enactment of the amendment to said section 3418,
innumerable suits have been brought and prosecuted for the specific enforcement of contracts for the sale of real estate made by agents who had no written authority authorizing them to make the sales; .... .In
order to put a
stop to that character of litigation, and for the purpose of preventing fraud
and perjury, the amendment in question was wisely enacted. The evil at which
the statute was aimed was feasting upon corporations as well as upon individual landowners; and there has been no suggestion made why the one should
not be protected therefrom as well as the other. The Donovan case . . . is
based upon neither reason nor authority . . . and should not be followed." It
should be noted that the person who acted in behalf of the corporation in
the Lindhorst case was a mere agent and not an officer of the corporation.
It is not clear, therefore, whether the Missouri court would reach the same
conclusion in respect to an officer of a corporation.
34 Hasenfratz v. Berger Apartments, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 12, (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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as to indicate an individual liability, but the court by way of dictum
clearly indicated its belief that the president by a proper signature,
if acting within the scope of his authority, could bind the corporation
without any written authorization.

".

.

. While an executive officer

of a corporation is in a sense, an agent, he is more than that; he is
the alter ego of the corporation. A signing by him is generally considered to be the act of the corporation itself and not the act of an
agent. Hence a signing by him, while acting on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of his authority, satisfies the statute requiring a signing by the party to be charged and not authorizing a
signing by an agent. Also, although there is authority to the contrary, he is not an agent within the meaning of statutes requiring the
authority of an agent to sign to be in writing...... 3' There are faint

indications in opposition to this view in two New York lower court
decisions; 36 but in those cases the court never had occasion to consider the distinction between executive officers and ordinary agents,
and hence their dicta are of little weight.
Since executive corporate officers may well be considered as
quasi-principals rather than agents, the majority position seems sound
in not requiring such officers to have written authority where they
are acting within the scope of their implied powers. The policy of
the statutes, to prevent frauds, would appear to be satisfied by demanding written authority in the case of minor agents while permitting major officials to act just as if they themselves were principals.
It would be unduly cumbersome to demand that such major officials
obtain written authority from the board of directors or stockholders
in every instance in which the agency provisions of the Statutes of
Frauds are involved.
ANDREW

DOES

P.

DONOVAN.

ENTRY UNDER VOID PAROL LEASE CREATE TENANCY FROM
YEAR TO YEAR IN NEW YORK

In these postwar days of housing shortages and scarcity of business sites, the legal problems presented by parol leases, which are
voidable under the Statute of Frauds,1 are rarely encountered. The
35 Id. at 15. The court here adopts a quotation from 37 C. J. S. Frauds,
Statute of, § 207 (1943), as its own.
36 Karnal v. Horovitz, 187 Misc. 851, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Klores v. Empire Title & Guarantee Co., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
1 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242. "An estate or interest in real property,
other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, . . . can not be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law,
or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent,
thereunto authorized by writing. ... "

